The picture Tigg paints of relativism is grim — and rather extreme. It’s definitely true that there are people who hold the views he ascribes to relativism and their position is nicely rebutted, but it’s also true that many who consider themselves “relativists” hold to much softer versions of the concept. Thus, while Tigg’s arguments are an effective antidote to extreme relativism, they aren’t an answer to every sort of moral relativism.
Tigg does not argue, for example, for “moral realism,” the idea that moral standards are just as “real” as gravity and just as independent of human culture, beliefs, and needs as the speed of light. If one is not such a moral realist, then one can be a relativist in the sense that moral standards are “relative” to human needs, human perspectives, and of course the human cultures which give form to our needs and perspectives.
Such a relativism is completely compatible with Tigg’s justified insistence that moral discourse be governed by reason and by reference to human nature. This is important to recognize because this is the sort of relativism most commonly attacked by religious conservatives who insist that morals are “real” and do exist independently of humanity, being creations of God after all.
It’s possible that Tigg wouldn’t want to label such positions as “relativist,” saving the term as a label of opprobrium for extremist positions. In the context of his book, at least, that may be fair — but it deserves to be said. Because there is genuine variety in the nature of positions that can be described as “moral relativism,” the absence of any discussion of this variety is a quite unfortunate. It also distracts from the arguments because every time Tigg has something negative to say about relativism, a reader instinctually feels the need to have reservations about the argument.
Tigg’s unnecessary and unfortunate generalizations extend to the political sphere as well because we find him saying positive things about “liberal society” and then almost incendiary rhetoric about how disreputable liberals are. All the while we hear nothing about how “liberals” have contributed to “liberal society,” much less that not all liberals agree with the ideas Tigg is quick to imprecate. As a consequence, liberals who read the book will be turned off without giving his ideas a fair hearing, while conservatives who are merely happy to hear their prejudices confirmed by a professor of philosophy may not fully appreciate what he is arguing for.
Generalizations are, for the most part, poor form — but when they distract from interesting arguments and valid points, they become downright bizarre. If one can keep in mind that Tigg’s generalizations are not all valid and that his caustic comments don’t apply to everyone involved, there is quite a lot to be learned here. He makes a very, very good case for the position that moral choices lie behind everything we do, that relativism can undermine our ability to talk or think rationally about moral choices, and that a greater focus on our moral values is a necessary condition to political, social, and personal progress.
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