Human dominion over the earth is not the only place in The Case for Humanism that Vaughn and Dacey part way. On the surface, such debate bodes well for the inherent uncertainty and anti-dogmatism humanism represents; but where there is fundamental disagreement, there can be no ism at all. Perhaps the most obvious such disagreement between the two authors is on the “free will” issue. Dacey, in his chapter on human nature, and in other writings on the subject outside this text, seems to take the hard deterministic side of the argument. He seems to acknowledge that free will is, at least, an illusion, and perhaps even a delusion. Vaughn, who writes the actual chapter on free will in The Case for Humanism — and who is therefore more obvious as to his opinion — seems to favor libertarianism.
In order to most accurately discuss this humanist “third rail” topic, I sought some assistance from Thomas Clark of the Center for Naturalism. The Case for Humanism clearly describes scientific naturalism as the dominant paradigm among scientists today. That paradigm suggests, among other things, that there is an objective, natural world we all live in; that there is no supernatural world whatsoever; and that the “mind” is the emergent property of the physical brain. By defending libertarianism, Vaughn defends what Clark considers to be an anti-scientific position regarding human behavior. Indeed, if we accept Clark’s definition of naturalism, we must also conclude that the contra-causal “free will” libertarianism advocates for, is as supernatural as angels and gods.
Vaughn argues that because some events on the quantum level are uncaused, then hard determinism, which is the claim that all actions are caused, is false. He also argues that compatibilism, which essentially is the claim that although actions are caused, we should still believe in the freedom to choose, does not hold water because it is possible for actions to actually be uncaused and still not be free. Finally Vaughn says that libertarianism, the claim advocating for uncaused actions and free will, is most probably true because our experience suggests that our actions are sometimes free.
Yet, according to Clark, it's generally accepted that random quantum effects in the micro-universe are not such that could affect the macro-universe in which we operate, therefore there are really no uncaused actions in human behavior. Additionally, “any action attributed to a random, uncaused factor couldn't count as a free act since after all you didn't cause it… the random, uncaused factor did.” Clark also argues that “the compatibilist freedom of voluntary action does not depend on the (impossible) power to have chosen oneself and one's desires from the ground up.”
But perhaps what is most interesting is Clark’s take on Libertarianism:
“The idea of libertarian agent causation - that people somehow cause things to happen but are not themselves fully caused is just about the most unscientific, illogical notion of freedom ever invented. And the idea that our subjective experience of having this sort of freedom counts as good evidence for it is again completely unscientific and insupportable. If I have the subjective experience of having a soul, or of being god, or of being the best baritone in Boston, does that make any of these things true? Clearly not. So why should we have more confidence in the evidential warrant of the subjective experience that we have libertarian freedom, especially given all the evidence on the other side that I and my behavior is fully caused?”
Clark’s point of view is key for humanism because the consequences of believing in libertarianism has resulted in some of the most insidious behavior in society. For instance, our criminal justice system is currently based more on retribution, than on real justice. Nor is there a real understanding of the nature of crime per say. Again, Clark:
“The question that libertarians must consider is: which state, our current laissez-faire disciplinarian state, or a mentor state, most infringes on freedom of choice, defined as the personal liberty to do as one wishes? It’s no contest. Coercive social control, which intervenes after the fact of misconduct, and depends primarily on retributively justified confinement with little or no rehabilitative amenities, reduces liberty far more than do social policies which encourage citizens to develop proclivities for making good choices in advance of potential misconduct. So, without any compromise of liberty up front (remember, ameliorative social programs aren’t coercive), we end up with better moral agents, less need for punishment, and thus an increase in liberty overall.”
