Widmar v. Vincent (1981)
Supreme Court Decisions on Religious Liberty
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Background Information
This was an important case involving the question of equal access to public facilities for religious organizations. The University of Missouri in Kansas City had, for quite some time, allowed various student groups to use classrooms to hold meetings. One of those student groups was Cornerstone and it used the rooms to hold prayers, Bible studies and religious discussions.
Everything proceeded fine for several years until the university withdrew permission from Cornerstone to use the rooms, citing a rule which had been passed five years previously but which had not ever been enforced. According to the university, the facilities could not be used "for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching."
The reason for this regulation was to avoid violations of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The university felt that permitting a religious group to use the rooms would have implied that they also supported or even encouraged those religious activities. The students, however, argued that this rule violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment - thus, this case was a perfect example of a conflict between the principles of establishment and free exercise and the effort to find a balance.
Court Decision
In a 8-1 decision written by Justice Lewis Powell, the Supreme Court ruled that, in this situation, the free exercise interests of the students outweighed any establishment concerns that the university might have. According to the Court, the university had essentially given up their argument because it had created a "limited open forum" by allowing groups to meet.
A limited open forum differes from an open forum because the university only allowed students to use the facilities rather than the general public. Even when the government creates a forum voluntarily and without being forced to, once that forum exists, the government must regulate it according to constitutional norms. This means that it cannot discriminate among those using the forum based upon characteristics like race, gender and religion.
It also means that the regulation must be content neutral - the government cannot permit some speech and exclude other speech simply because it happens to approve of some speech while disapproving of other ideas. This was the crucial point for the decision because the university permitted other student groups to use the rooms and engage in other sorts of speech. Contrary to the university's position, allowing religious groups the same access as other groups did not violate the Establishment Clause by implying support or encouragement for religious speech.
The University's argument misconceives the nature of this case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The University has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of the content to their speech. In this context we are unpersuaded that the primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance religion. We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely effects. It is possible - perhaps even foreseeable - that religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities. But this Court has explained that a religious organization's enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion.
Of course, the university is free to regulate things like the time, place and manner for groups to meet, so long as those regulations apply to all groups. However, imposing restrictions on certain groups based solely upon the content of the speech is invalid.
Although he agreed with the decision, Justice Stevens disagreed with the reasoning and wrote a concurring opinion. According to Stevens, university facilities are a limited resource and exist for the primary purpose of advancing the university's educational goals. This, then, justifies making decisions based upon content. The content-based discrimination cannot be for just any reason, however. It must be based upon the university's goals:
I do not subscribe to the view that a public university has no greater interest in the content of student activities than the police chief has in the content of a soapbox oration on Capitol Hill. A university legitimately may regard some subjects as more relevant to its educational mission than others. But the university, like the police officer, may not allow its agreement or disagreement with the viewpoint of a particular speaker to determine whether access to a forum will be granted. If a state university is to deny recognition to a student organization - or is to give it a lesser right to use school facilities than other student - it must have a valid reason for doing so.
Justice White dissented completely, arguing that not allowing the religious group would only have a minimal impact upon members' free exercise:
Respondents complain that compliance with the regulation would require them to meet "about a block and a half" from campus under conditions less comfortable than those previously available on campus. I view this burden on free exercise as minimal. Because the burden is minimal, the State need do no more than demonstrate that the regulation furthers some permissible state end. The State's interest in avoiding claims that it is financing or otherwise supporting religious worship - in maintaining a definitive separation between church and State - is such an end. That the State truly does mean to act toward this end is amply supported by the treatment of religion in the State Constitution. Thus, I believe the interest of the State is sufficiently strong to justify the imposition of the minimal burden on respondents' ability freely to exercise their religious beliefs.
Significance
This case plays a significant role in how the courts and government agencies understand the concept of "equal access" when it comes to allowing religious groups to use government facilities. Because of this decision and other decisions like it, government agencies understand that when they open their buildings to use by community organizations, they must open the buildings to religious organizations on the exact same basis. Justice White's argument that preference for secular groups over religious groups should be permitted when there is no undue burden on religious organizations has found no traction and little support.
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