Nietzsche vs. Gibson
Suffering, Debt, and Guilt
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One of the curious features of Mel Gibson's film "The Passion" is how it is almost entirely preoccupied with the suffering and death of Jesus. We are told nothing about his message or his ministry - even the resurrection is given little attention. In their place, the camera lingers over Jesus' reaction to being whipped and even over the stripping of his flesh through torture. What does this have to say about Mel Gibson's theology and, perhaps, Christianity generally?
Gibson's movie is an artistic portrayal of what he considers the most important parts of Jesus' life: his suffering and death. In a well-made movie, nothing extraneous is kept in. Gibson is a good movie-maker, so we can comfortably assume that he only used those aspects of the gospel stories that he considers really significant - which means that Jesus' ministry, message, and even resurrection are not as significant as Jesus' death and suffering.
Aspects of this are often called the "atonement" theory and the "ransom" theory of salvation. Jesus had to "ransom" us from Satan through his life. Jesus also had to "atone" for our sins by being sacrificed to God. Indeed, there are times in interviews where Jesus interchanges "the Crucifixion" with "the sacrifice." Gibson's film is, in essence, an attempt to display in as shocking a manner as possible that Jesus endured incredible agony as a sign of God's love for us and in order to repay God for our sins.
What does any of this have to do with Nietzsche? Well, he had quite a few things to say about the relationship between morality and suffering. Chris at the blog Crooked Timber wrote about how some of Nietzsche's commentary on morality and Christianity can be applied to the reactions to Mel Gibson's movie "The Passion," and I thought that I would take another look Nietzsche's book and see what can be drawn out from his writing.
Suffering to Pay off Debts
First, let's take a look at what Nietzsche had to say on the idea that there can be any connection between suffering and the repayment of debts - or, to use the Christian term, "atonement":
Let me pose the question once more: to what extent can suffering be a compensation for "debts"? To the extent that making someone suffer provides the highest degree of pleasure, to the extent that the person hurt by the debt, in exchange for the injury and for the distress caused by the injury, got an offsetting pleasure - making someone suffer - a real feast, something that, as I've said, was valued all the more, the greater the difference between him and the rank and social position of the creditor. [Genealogy of Morality, Section 6]
The idea of suffering having a transactional value plays an important role in Christianity. According to traditional, orthodox Christian soteriology (study of salvation), humanity is mired in sin and, because of this sin, deserves eternal punishment in Hell. Fortunately, God loves humanity and doesn't want to see us suffer. To keep us out of Hell, God sent his son to suffer and die in our place, thus paying our cosmic debt and freeing us from sin - this is the the theme of Gibson's "The Passion."
This assumes, however, that the suffering and death of one individual can suffice to replace the suffering (eternal torment in Hell) of any other person or any group of people. Suffering must have transactional value - it must be something that can be traded in exchange for other things that have transactional value, whether other suffering or something different entirely. Work has transactional value. I can do work for you (like chopping wood) for a couple of hours and thereby relieve some debt I owe you because, in the end, you possess something (chopped wood) that you value as much as what I owed.
Can the same be said for suffering? Nietzsche argues that this can only be the case if you gain the value of seeing me suffer and that has value because you hate me and wish my ill - but that would suggest that you are a sadist, not that suffering has transactional value.
Could someone else suffer in my place to pay my debt? Someone else could chop wood in my place, and then I would owe them rather than you. That same does not seem to be true of suffering, however. Even if we take the more extreme case and imagine that you would derive pleasure from my suffering, such that you would accept my suffering in exchange for a debt I owe you, we couldn't conclude that you would accept the suffering of someone else in my place unless you are a general sadist and would take pleasure in the suffering of any random person.
Thus, if suffering is to have any sort of value, it would only be for sadists who take pleasure in seeing the suffering of others. For everyone else, suffering isn't something that can serve as "a debit entry in some ledger." What, then, would that say about a god which required that someone suffer in order to pay off any sort of debt you or I owe?
One Debt Relieved, Another Assumed
Christianity goes a bit further than simply portraying suffering as a means of relieving debt. According to Christianity, no amount of suffering by us can actually relieve our debts - we are far too sinful, far too degenerate for that route anymore. But, because God loves us, another was sent to suffer and die in our place - God's only son, who actually is worthy as a sacrifice:
There can be no doubt: first of all against the "debtor," in whom from this point on bad conscience, firmly set in him, eating into him and spreading out like a polyp, grows wide and deep, until finally, with the impossibility of discharging the debt, people think up the idea of the impossibility of removing the penance, the idea that the debt cannot be paid off ("eternal punishment"). Finally however, those ideas of "debt" and "duty" turn back even against the "creditor." ... [A]ll of a sudden we confront the paradoxical and horrifying expedient with which a martyred humanity found temporary relief, that stroke of genius of Christianity - God's sacrifice of himself for the guilt of human beings, God paying himself back with himself, God as the only one who can redeem man from what for human beings has become impossible to redeem - the creditor sacrifices himself for the debtor, out of love (can people believe that?), out of love for his debtor! ... [Genealogy of Morality, Section 21]
Nietzsche's point here is that a trick has been played on us: our "debt" has been paid by someone else's blood, but now we are indebted once again for the sacrifice that has been made on our behalf! This is no longer really a blood debt which can be repaid but, rather, a psychological debt which creates an inordinate amount of pressure on a person. How can anyone possibly show sufficient gratitude for what has been done in their name?
This is exactly the sort of reaction which I think Mel Gibson hoped to create in making his movie. The whole point of depicting the suffering of Jesus in excessive, even exquisite, detail is to make viewers feel as guilty and uncomfortable as possible. They are to be laden with the burden of believing that they, personally, are responsible not only for Jesus having to be killed (because of their terrible sins) but even for the actual and brutal killing itself.
The consequence, then, is to encourage in people the belief that the debt of their sins, owed to God, was paid to God by God having God tortured and murdered by the debtors - us. We debtors were thus relieved of one debt but then burdened with another, neither of which were ever of our choosing or even something that ever benefitted us in the first place.
According to Lee Strobel, the "former atheist" who wrote "The Case for Christ" and "The Case for Faith," has been quoted as saying that ["The Passion"] was "An anointed piece of art." That God "selected" Mel to do this. If that is true, there is no room allowed for rejecting the sacrifice or, by extension, even the film itself. Because the sacrifice was so extreme, a person would be guilty of the most perverse egotism to turn their backs upon it. Because the film was so graphic, a person would have to unbelievably insensitive and hard-hearted not to be swept away by the emotional whip Gibson uses.
Nietzsche called it a "mental cruelty" and an "insanity of will" for a person to engage in such psychological self-flagellation. People believe that there is no possible way for them to be adequately punished for their crimes, but once someone else is punished there is also no possible way for them to show the appropriate gratitude. The consequence of such guilt are feelings of extreme worthlessness and, apparently, Christianity.
Of course, one can always turn around, seize the whip out of Gibson's hands, and insist on a little human dignity. We can deny that human beings are as degenerate as Gibson's theology requires and point out that the only "degenerate" in this sordid story is a god which demands blood and suffering to "atone" for any crimes - a god which would consider the suffering of an innocent being as means for the guilty to be freed. If that doesn't leave anything of Christianity to work with, so be it - I don't think it's something we'll miss.
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