A common position on the proper relationship between church and state is that of accommodation. According to accommodationists, the First Amendment should be read much more narrowly than it has been in recent years. Some go so far as to argue that the First Amendment prohibits the government from doing nothing other than creating a National Church — everything else is permitted. Is this, however, a valid position to adopt?
- As currently employed, the very concept of accommodation suggests the need of the state to define that to which it is making accommodation. And accommodate to what? Who is to accommodate whom? Which demands require accommodation? Which may be legitimately denied? Would it be so simple to substitute for "it's just a little prayer" the phrase "it's just a little satan adoration"? The power to accommodate is the power to control and therefore to refuse accommodation.
- Robert S. Alley, Without a Prayer: Religious Expression in Public Schools, (1996)
As the label implies, the main principle upon which accommodationists base their position is the idea that the government should “accommodate” religious needs and the desires of religious institutions whenever possible. When it comes to the separation of church and state, there should not be quite so much separation and a bit more interaction. Accommodationists tend to argue that, when it comes to religious matters (just as with other issues), “majority rule” should be the guiding principle. Thus, if the majority in a local community wants to have particular sectarian prayers in schools or during town council meetings, then that should be accommodated.
Accommodationism was more common in the United States before the Civil War. During that time, there was much less separation of church and state because government at all levels took an active role in supporting, or at least endorsing, religion — specifically, Protestant Christianity. Such support was assumed as a given and was rarely, if ever, questioned by religious minorities.
This began to change after the Civil War, when many groups tried to make the government endorsement of Protestant Christianity more explicit and extensive. This galvanized religious minorities, in particular Jews and Catholics, to become more assertive in their demand for religious equality. By the end of the 19th century, the public assumption of the validity of accommodationism began to erode as Jewish leaders advocated an end to Bible readings in public schools, the elimination of Sunday closing laws, and the repeal of laws designed to enforce Christian morality.
Today, the accommodationist approach has been gaining ground. It certainly benefits from an appealing title — why would anyone object to the government "accommodating" people's religious beliefs? If someone doesn't want religion to be "accommodated," it is easy to think that they oppose religion somehow and want there to be disharmony between church and state — perhaps even that they should be estranged or alienated from one another. That isn't likely to sound very good to the average religious believer.
Robert S. Alley asks us to consider the issue more deeply and seriously, though. To "accommodate" religion, the state must adapt to the needs of religion and/or provide religion with something needed. This naturally involves defining what qualifies as a "religion" that can be accommodated and choosing what needs will be met. None of that is without peril. The state already has to define "religion" for purposes like taxation, but that is a much more distant relationship than is envisioned by accommodationists. If the state is to accommodate religion, are the very broad and loose definitions of religion sufficient?
Who is to decide which needs of religion will be accommodated, and based upon what standards? If "majority rule" is the standard, how can that possibly be kept from becoming a de facto majority repression of minority faiths? Moreover, if the state is to accommodate religion, what's to keep the state from expecting churches to accommodate to the government? If "accommodation" becomes the guiding principle of church/state relations, there doesn't seem to be much to ensure that it only operates in one direction.
As Alley notes, accommodation and control are not as distant as people might like to think. If the state has the power to accommodate to religion, it has the power to refuse accommodation — and such choices are not only forms of control, but are also automatically expressions of preference or favor. Where do government bureaucrats derive the authority to prefer or favor certain religions and/or religious beliefs over others?
