Epistemology involves questions about the nature and definition of truth. Epistemology is the study of human knowledge - the grounds and conditions under which we can know anything. Knowledge, in turn, is normally defined in terms of truth - only true things can be known so no false ideas qualify as knowledge. Therefore, any discussion about knowledge must implicitly also be a discussion about the nature of truth - but what do we mean by 'true'? And what does it mean to say something isn’t true?
There are two general schools of thought for how beliefs originate: voluntarist and involuntarist. Theists, and Christians in particular, commonly argue the voluntarist position. Only if we can be held morally responsible for our beliefs can disbelief be treated as a sin. It isn't possible to defend the idea of atheists going to hell unless they can be held morally accountable for their atheism. Better arguments can be made for involuntarism than for voluntarism, however.
It may sound odd to wonder how and why truth matters - under most circumstances the importance of truth should be obvious. Nevertheless, the question of truth does have problems which are difficult to address; among them is the question of what role the notion of 'truth' plays in our philosophy and our understanding of the world around us.
When someone refers to a 'truth' or claims that some statement is 'true,' just what kind of truth are they referring to? This may seem like an odd question at first because we so rarely think about the possibility that there may be more than one type of truth out there, but there are indeed different categories of truth which need to be kept in mind.
The advantages of truth over untruth, reality over falsehood, appear so obvious that it seems inconceivable that anyone would even draw it into question, much less suggest the opposite - that untruth may in fact be preferable to truth. But that is just what German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche did - and so perhaps the advantages of truth are not as clear-cut as we normally assume.
The Correspondence Theory of Truth is probably the most common and widespread way of understanding the nature of truth and falsehood - not simply among philosophers, but even more importantly in the general population as well. Put quite simply, the Correspondence Theory argues that “truth” is whatever corresponds to reality. An idea which corresponds with reality is true while an idea which does not correspond with reality is false.
The Coherence Theory of Truth is probably second or third in popularity to the Correspondence Theory. Originally developed by Hegel and Spinoza, it often seems to be an accurate description of how our conception of truth actually works. Put simply: a belief is true when we are able to incorporate it in an orderly and logical manner into a larger and complex system of beliefs.
The Pragmatic Theory of Truth is, predictably enough, a product of Pragmatism, an American philosophy developed during the early and mid twentieth century. Pragmatists identified the nature of truth with the principle of action. Put simply, truth does not exist in some abstract realm of thought independent of social relationship or actions; instead, truth is a function of an active process of engagement with the world and verification.
Apologists for unscientific beliefs declare sooner or later that ‘Science does not have all the answers.’ Since nobody in the history of modern science has ever said it does, we could dismiss this objection for the irrelevancy that it is and move on to more pertinent issues. However, we may suppose that the apologist is actually objecting, not to an imagined claim by scientists that they have all the answers, but to an inferred claim by the skeptic that no other answers are worth considering.
A criterion of truth is any standard that is used to differentiate between true beliefs and false beliefs. Criteria of truth are also often called standards of verification because they are the means by which we verify the accuracy of certain claims. The criteria of custom, tradition, and authority are fundamentally social in nature.
Many people seem to base their ideas about what is 'true' and what is 'false' upon some form of majority opinion. Sometimes this takes the form of a simple majority vote, sometimes of a statistical sampling, and other times the 'general consensus' of all people around the world. Whatever the actual form, the basic premise here is that 'truth' is best distinguished from 'falsehood' by observing what most others believer to be the case.
This second group of criteria for truth are very personal and internal, involving the manner in which a person reacts to the outside world and even the very nature of their character. Although the development of all three (emotions, intuition, and instinct) certainly depends upon one’s social circumstances and background, they are in the end fundamentally very subjective.
Both revelation and faith occupy unique positions among the various criteria of truth because of their religious character. Sometimes they are social in nature, as when we speak of revelations to a community or the working of faith in religious groups. Sometimes they are very personal and subjective, for example when a single person claims to receive a revelation or relies upon faith in the quiet moments of life.
Perhaps the simplest test for separating truth from falsehood is to focus upon that which is real: if something corresponds accurately to reality, then it is true. If it doesn’t correspond accurately to reality, then of course it must be false. Easy, right?
One common criterion of truth is simple, straightforward pragmatism: if a belief 'works,' then it must be true. If it doesn’t work, then it must be false and should be discarded in favor of something else. This criterion has the distinct advantage of being readily testable - in fact, the principle that beliefs and ideas must be verified before being accepted resonates strongly in scientific circles.
As tests of truth, both consistency and coherence are relativistic criteria. Instead of measuring a belief directly against an outside reality, they measure a belief against other beliefs. If that belief is consistent with or coheres with already-held beliefs, then it is considered true. If it fails to be consistent or to cohere, then it is discarded as false.
The idea of truth as objective is simply that no matter what we believe to be the case, some things will always be true and other things will always be false. Our beliefs, whatever they are, have no bearing on the facts of the world around us. That which is true is always true - even if we stop believing it and even if we stop existing at all.
Although there may be sound logical and pragmatic reasons for assuming that there are things which are true independent of us and our beliefs, we should ask ourselves whether that constitutes solid grounds for actually believing that truth is objective. Arguing that we don’t have such grounds is known as Philosophical Skepticism.
According to doctrines of epistemological subjectivism or relativism, there are no 'truths' which are not subjective to persons and/or relative to individual beliefs, cultures, time periods, etc. Obviously this position covers a lot of potential ground - two people might both be relativists, but they might disagree on just what truth is relative to.
Both the description of truth as being objective and as being subjective have their strengths. It doesn’t seem possible for one to reasonably reject either in its entirety. Is there, then, any means of developing some comfortable middle ground which acknowledges and makes use of the valid insights which both offer?
