A great many theists, especially those who are part of western monotheistic traditions like Christianity and Islam, would be aghast at the very idea of anyone presuming to judge God. After all, isn’t God so much better than us that it is presumptuous to sit in judgment? Ironically, the very attempt to assert that God is too good for us to judge is itself a judgment. What's more, if we aren't supposed to judge God, then all the claims that God is "good" are baseless.
Brian Davies addresses the contradiction thus:
But what is the background for judging the Creator ex nihilo? There cannot be any, in which case the God of classical theism cannot be said to be even capable of succeeding or failing. And in that case he cannot be a moral agent, for such an agent must be able either to succeed or to fail.
- Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion.
It appears that we have a couple of options. We can insist on trying to arrive at an honest judgment, good or bad, depending upon whatever the evidence tells us. We can refuse to offer any judgment at all and therefore also refuse to label this God as good, bad, or indifferent. Finally, we can accept what religious leaders claim that this God has said about itself and, thus, label this God as “good” simply because it (or its representatives) has said that it is good.
Of the three, the first seems to me to be the most reasonable course of action. The second is at least consistent with the idea that God cannot be judged, but it’s not at all consistent with the various traditions that insist that God is good. The third is simply the abdication of personal responsibility and moral standards. Sadly, it may be the option chosen by too many religious believers.
How to Judge God
Once we decide that we should at least try to judge God, how can we go about doing it? After all, we wouldn’t accept a judgment of ourselves if done in a complete vacuum. If some action of ours is to be labeled good or bad, we should insist that all important and relevant circumstances be taken into consideration. If our character as a whole is to be judged, we would insist that the circumstances of our lives and even our birth be taken into consideration. A judgment in a vacuum would probably not be fair or reasonable.
It’s not clear, though, what circumstances we could take into consideration when judging a god. There is, as Brian Davies notes, there is no background information we can consider when judging a Creator of the universe. We cannot say that, given the circumstances in which the universe was formed, God either did a good or a bad job.
Of course, this doesn't mean that there is no information which can be considered. The consequences of God’s actions (and inactions) are certainly worth looking at and using. Thus, since we have something to judge by, perhaps a judgment is possible.
At the same time we should also keep Davies’ central point in mind: if God isn’t a moral agent in the first place, then even the worst consequences wouldn’t warrant judging God as being morally bad. We don’t label hurricanes as immoral because they aren’t moral agents, no matter how much death and destruction they cause.
Understanding Moral Agents
So what is a moral agent? Often it is defined as a being whose actions are capable of moral evaluation, but that isn’t very helpful here — we need to know is what makes a being’s actions capable of moral evaluation. First, a moral agent must be capable of choice in some fashion. If they can’t choose one course of action over another, then at least in that particular case they can’t be described as moral agents (hurricanes can't choose where they go).
A second factor would be intention: a being must be capable of intending some action and/or outcome. If a person really lives from second to second, never planning or intending anything, then it is difficult to see how their actions could be subject to moral evaluation. If we imagined a person with brain damage that prevented them from comprehending the existence of a future, such that they were incapable of planning ahead or acting with any future goals, then we couldn't hold them morally accountable for what they choose to do.
This brings us to the ability to “succeed or fail,” as Davies puts it. If a being intends to do good and chooses to do good, but it is impossible for them to fail to do good, are we really justified in evaluating them positively? If a being intends to cause harm and chooses to do something bad, but it was impossible for them to fail and do no harm, can we really evaluate them negatively? If it was impossible for me to fail at some task, would it still make sense to congratulate me? If it was impossible for me to succeed at some task, would it still make sense to criticize me?
It's not hard to see why this is significant: if it's impossible for a being succeed or impossible for it to fail, then the notion of "choice" hardly applies anymore. We might like the being that does good better than the one that does evil, but concluding that the first is "good" while the second is "bad" would be difficult. Such a being is simply doing the only thing it can do; nothing more and nothing less. That's not a moral agent any more than a hurricane is.
