This argument is sometimes used in conjunction with the Argument from Design and is supposed to rebut the philosophies of naturalism and materialism. According to this argument, neither naturalism nor materialism can give an adequate explanation of mental events like consciousness. Consequently, divine and supernatural explanations are needed to explain why we are conscious and how our brains work.
Richard Swineburne is a well known apologist who uses this argument, stating that it is impossible to reduce mental events or properties to physical events or properties and that any attempt to do so would face serious problems. His conclusion is that certain psychological and physical events correlate with each other simply because God chose for them to correlate — nothing more, nothing less. In his own words:
- How could brain-states vary except in their physical composition and the speed and direction of their electro-chemical interaction, and how could there be a natural connection between variations in these respects and variations in the kind of respects in which intentions differ — say, the difference between intendingargument from consciousness mind brain richard swineburne theism gods existence to sign a cheque, intending to square a circle, and intending to lecture for half an hour? There does not seem to be the beginning of a prospect of a simple scientific theory of this kind and so of having established laws of mind-body interaction as opposed to lots of diverse correlations.
There are a number of problems with this argument. The most obvious is that people like Swineburne are creating what is essentially a complex Argument from Ignorance: since we don't know how it works, we'll never know how it works — and thus, there is no natural explanation. The Argument from Ignorance is a logical fallacy. The mere fact that we do not know how something works does not mean that we never will and it certainly does not mean that there is no natural explanation.
This argument is also open to easy parody. One could just as effectively argue that it is not possible to reduce digestive events or properties to physical events or properties — and thus conclude that digestion has no natural explanation. But that is absurd — digestion does not occur in one place and with one event. Digestion is a process involving many different body parts. It is not localizable in one place or in one natural law.
Similarly, consciousness and mental activity is a process — it happens all over and is simply the expression of what is going on. The fact that we cannot reduce it to a single place or a single event is no more a problem here than it is with digestion!
The deliberate opposition to naturalism in this argument is also problematic. Naturalism is the belief that all objects, events, and even values can be fully explained in terms of factual and/or causal claims about the natural world. Supernaturalism is just the opposite — the belief that events and values require supernatural powers or authority for their explanation. Natural explanations may be reliable on an immediate level, but they in turn must eventually require a supernatural cause.
Unfortunately, even for theists naturalism is prior supernaturalism. In any debate or discussion, there are a few basic presuppositions which all must share: the validity of logic, the existence of other minds, the existence of a common world, and the stability of that common world.
All of these premises are naturalistic, not supernaturalistic — and hence naturalism is prior to supernaturalism with the latter being an extra addition to a person's assumptions. Without assuming naturalism and the continuity of the observable world — and that you both share much the same experience of that world - how can you possibly succeed in having any discussion with someone?
The answer is that you can't. The answer is that you do have to assume naturalism rather than supernaturalism first — but the Argument from Consciousness attempts to deny this and, hence, deny the basis for having a rational argument in the first place.
