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Omniscience

Written: June 30, 1999


Wherever you find people talking about a god they believe in, you'll likely also find them attributing, either explicitly or implicitly, the characteristic of "omniscience" to this god. But what is it and does it really make any sense? I don't believe that it does - omniscience is one of the more problematic aspects of alleged gods. It conflicts not only with the reality we all know, but also with other alleged characteristics which gods tend to have. In fact, the concept of omniscience is so badly flawed that it casts serious doubt upon the validity of traditional god-concepts which have made use of it as a characteristic.

What is omniscience? The most simple and traditional definition is to "know everything." Other variations have developed over the centuries as theologians have attempted to get around its flaws, but for the time being it is better to stick with the simple and original definition. Variations will be addressed later on as they become necessary.

And of course, it wouldn't be right to discuss the flaws in "knowing all" without addressing what it means to "know" at all. Theories of knowledge have taken up large, dense books by famous philosophers, but I don't intend to repeat all of their work here. It will suffice to cover a few important points which tend to be relatively uncontroversial among most contemporary writers


Nature of Knowledge

Knowledge, fundamentally speaking, involves concepts and abstractions in our brains. As such, the most basic requirement for knowledge are a conscious, living being. As best as can be determined, knowledge cannot be achieved outside of living beings which are conscious at least some of the time. Two other characteristics appear vital: those of acquisition and verification. Since knowledge exists as abstractions, it must be abstracted from something - so knowledge is something we acquire over time rather than are simply born with. In this way knowledge is distinguished from instinct and instinctual actions.

The other important feature is verification - the process by which we make sure that what hear has some basis in truth. This is vital because we are fallible - it isn't true that any idea which occurs to us is correct. Since it makes no sense to say that a person knows something which is false (i.e., that 2 + 2 = 5), we must make some effort to verify information before being able to properly say that we know it.

There are also three general categories of knowledge which will be very important in our look at omniscience. The first is factual or propositional knowledge - this is when we make statements which are factually correct. For example: I know that Germany fought in World War II. The second is procedural knowledge - this is when we know how to go about doing something. Examples would include gymnastics or juggling - and these point out that procedural knowledge involves more than reading a book. Reading about how to juggle is not the same as actually being able to do it. When someone claims to know how to juggle, we assume that they can actually perform the act rather than that they've merely read an instruction manual. The third type is the knowledge of personal experience, which is the type meant when someone says "I know war" or "I know pain." In these instances, the person can draw upon personal experiences not otherwise available to others.


Omniscience vs. Knowledge

Now that we have a better understanding of some of the minimum basics of what constitutes knowledge, we can take a look at whether or not it and omniscience are compatible at any levels.

For a god to have omniscience, it would have to be conscious and alive - but does it make much sense to say that a god is "alive?" Our only experience of life is through physical, biological processes. Indeed, all definitions of "life" are based upon basic aspects of biology like metabolism and growth. Does it make any sense to apply the same word to a being for which nothing in biology is supposed to apply? Does it make any sense to apply a physical term to an allegedly non-physical being? I don't think so, and so believe that life and hence also knowledge might be concepts excluded from a non-physical god.

We can say the same about the quality of consciousness, since once again everything points to it being inextricably linked to physical, biological processes. Consciousness is a manifestation of the physical and biological processes of our brain just as digestion is a manifestation of the physical and biological processes of our digestive organs. There is no more evidence of consciousness being independent of the functioning of the brain than there is of digestion being independent of the functioning of the stomach and intestines.

When the concepts of consciousness and life are taken out of their natural contexts, they become vague abstractions lacking real substance. Theists simply shouldn't use these terms when they can only be meant in ways radically different from common usage. Ditto with knowledge - we must conclude from the above that "knowledge" cannot mean the same in application to a god as it does in normal usage.

Quote of the week:

Man, as a curious accident in a backwater, is intelligible: his mixture of virtues and vices is such as might be expected to result from a fortuitous origin. But only abysmal self-complacency can see in Man a reason which Omniscience could consider adequate as a motive for the Creator. The Copernican revolution will not have done its work until it has taught men more modesty than is to be found among those who think Man sufficient evidence of Cosmic Purpose.

Bertrand Russell (1872--1970) Religion and Science
As previously indicated, acquisition and verification are two vital aspects to knowledge as we understand it. But when it comes to a typical omniscient god, neither of them make sense. If such a god were to acquire knowledge, then it couldn't have always been omniscient - and this means that omniscience is really an acquired trait, not an inherent characteristic. Thus we can't really say that this god is defined by omniscience. The idea of verification raises similar problems. If a god has to verify a claim, then that means it isn't certain that the claim is fact - and hence is not currently omniscient. If a god ever had to verify a claim, then it was at some point not omniscient.

In all of these points, we see that if "knowledge" is used in conjunction with an allegedly omniscient god, then it can't be knowledge in the form we understand it. It doesn't look anything like the sort of thing we mean when we use the term in conjunction with humans or even other animals. This can only mean that the difference between our sort of knowledge and such a god's sort of knowledge is a matter of kind, not simply of degree. Not only would it be a good idea to find some other term, but any explanation of the nature of our knowledge won't serve to explain this god's knowledge. It's a totally different animal, so explanation and justification will have to start from the ground up.


Omniscience vs. Free Will

Another tricky issue is whether or not genuine omniscience is in any way compatible with free will - either ours or the alleged god's. To start with our free will, it has been observed many times that if a god knows the future with infallible certainty, then what this god knows will necessarily happen - there is no possibility for anything else to occur. We are, then, incapable of altering the future. Although the concept of human "free will" is hotly contested, I'm not aware of any theory of free will which could be conidered compatible with a being perfectly knowing the future. If a god knows who will win the next presidential election, then it isn't possible for anyone else to win. That's predestination - and some theologians have unflinchingly embraced it, for example John Calvin.

Others, however, have recognized that this is a tremendous problem and have sought to remedy it. A few try to argue that their god is "outside time," and hence sees the whole course of history all at once. But this removes god from the realm of intelligibility and knowability, and reduces theism to an incoherent agnosticism. Moreover, it doesn't ultimately solve the problem at hand: even if a god is simply sitting outside of time and observing the whole of history, then that means that only one course of history is possible - otherwise the picture for this god would keep shifting and it wouldn't have perfect knowledge of what happens. At best, it means that we are predestined without this god forcing it - but we are still predestined, just with an unintelligible god acting as an audience.

Still others reach for a more popular solution, namely to argue that their god has a "limited omniscience." This god knows everything, where everything means only what it can logically know. Everything doesn't really mean "everything" anymore - instead it means a limited but not yet defined set of things which will become more limited as more problems with the concept of omniscience are discovered.

Thus, certain realms of knowledge are closed to the supposedly "omniscient" god. We will revisit this again later, but from the outset it seems clear that a "limited omniscience" linguistically nonsensical. The word "limited" and the prefix "omni-" logically contradict each other. If a god is in any fashion limited in its knowledge, then it isn't really omniscient - and to say that it is becomes an exercise in confusion, if not deception.

Now what about this god's freedom? A legion of contradictions emerges when we consider a god which is both omniscient and possesses free will. Some theologians readily admit that the same problems as above exist here, but have yet to invent an adequate solution. For a god to be free in action, then its future must not be fully known in advance - there must be the possibility for a change of mind. If a god cannot freely alter its actions, then it cannot be said to be free. But this means that the god itself cannot perfectly know its own future. There must be true propositions about the future which it does not know.

In fact, it can be argued that this god cannot know anything at all about the future. Unlike the rest of us, such a god can always intervene in the course of human events and perform a miracle. We usually have to sit and allow nature to take its course - but this god doesn't. Yet for a miracle to be a free act, it cannot be known in advance. And if this god changes its mind, then we cannot say that it really did know in advance what would happen, much less know it perfectly.

For example, if a hurricane is approaching Orlando, poised to punish the city for it's tolerance of homosexuality, we simply have to sit and wait for it to hit. A traditional sort of god, however, has the choice to turn it away. If the decision to do so or to allow it to hit is to be free, this god cannot know for sure what it will do in advance. Since this god cannot know for sure if it will intervene, then it cannot know for sure if the hurricane really will hit. The same is true for every single event which this god can alter.

Since god cannot know in advance if and when it might perform any miracle, it cannot really know what will happen in any given situation. Once again some people reach and claim for their god a limited sort of omniscience, but I must raise the same objections that it makes no linguistic sense. So if a god is supposed to have both omniscience and free will, then it does not exist.

Don't miss the other section:

Part 2: Omniscience vs. God, Goodness & Humanity

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