Jones v. City of Opelika (1942)
Religious Tax Exemptions: Licensing & Taxing Religion
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Should people who earn their living by selling or distributing religious materials be required to pay the same licensing fees and taxes as are expected of those who sell or distribute non-religious materials? Does "freedom of religion" also mean "freedom from having to pay government fees" like everyone else?
Background Information
The city of Opelika, Alabama, charged Jones, a Jehovah's Witness, with violating a statute by selling books without a license. The contributions were not required; people without money were still given the literature. All licenses were subject to immediate revocation by the city without requiring advance notice.
Jones claimed that this violated both his rights to freedoms of the press and religion. His suit stated that he should be permitted to distribute his message without interference from government regulators.
This case was combined with two similar cases: Bowden et al. v. City of Fort Smith, Arkansas and Jobin v. State of Arizona.
Court Decision
With a majority opinion written by Justice Reed, the Court upheld the statute because it only covered individuals engaged in an commercial activity rather than specifically singling out those engaged in religious rituals.
According to the Court, individual rights must be balanced against competing rights of the state. The mere fact that a person is engaged in disseminating religious materials does not necessarily place his action above regulation by the state:
When, as in these cases, the practitioners of these noble callings choose to utilize the vending of their religious books and tracts as a source of funds, the financial aspects of their transactions need not be wholly disregarded. To subject any religious or didactic group to a reasonable fee for their money-making activities does not require a finding that the licensed acts are purely commercial. It is enough that money is earned by the sale of articles.
The Court also rejected the argument that the existence of regulations and taxations amount to a form of censorship by other means:
The differences between censorship and complete prohibition, either of subject matter or the individuals participating, upon the one hand, and regulation of the conduct of individuals in the time, manner and place of their activities upon the other, are decisive. ... There is to be noted, too, a distinction between nondiscriminatory regulation of operations which are incidental to the exercise of religion or the freedom of speech or the press and those which are imposed upon the religious rite itself or the unmixed dissemination of information.
When common means of distribution are used by religious groups, they can be held to the same standards as non-religious groups using the same methods - they don't get special exemptions simply because they are religious.
Chief Justice Stone, along with Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy, dissented, arguing that the licensing laws were unconstitutional because they represented a restriction on the plaintiffs freedoms and that was, in turn, partly a consequence of the fact that once a license was granted, it could be revoked at any time and for any reason, without there being any recourse for appeal or independent judicial assessment.
Justice Murphy also wrote that the lack of a commercial, for-profit aspect to the dissemination of the religious material was important:
..the taxes are in reality taxes upon the dissemination of religious ideas, a dissemination carried on by the distribution of religious literature for religious reasons alone and not for personal profit. As such they place a burden on freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the exercise of religion even if the question of amount is laid aside.
Significance
This decision forced religious groups to meet the same requirements as non-religious groups engaged in a similar activity. According to the Court, the mere fact that they sell religious materials cannot exempt them from statutes regulating general commercial acts.
But eleven months later the Court vacated this decision and struck down such fees.
Further Information
Back To: Court Decisions on Religious Liberty (main page)
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