Aguilar v. Felton (1985)
Supreme Court Decisions on Religious Liberty
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Background Information
New York City reimbursed the salaries of public employees who also taught classes in parochial schools. Under the Title I program of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, state funds were given to public schools for remedial reading and math programs to children from poor families. It did not matter what school the children attended - public, private or religious.
Teachers were thus sent to parochial schools in order to help low-income children with special needs. The city chose the teachers who would go and directly supervised their instruction. A group of taxpayers brought suit against the city claiming that the program violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.
Court Decision
In a 5-4 Court Decision in 1985, the Court overturned New York City's program of paying the salaries of public employees who provided any remedial assistance to low-income students in parochial school environments.
In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan wrote that this program differed from those at issue in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball (which were mostly permitted) because the classes were closely monitored for religious content. This "pervasive monitoring" did not save the program, however, because, by requiring close cooperation and day-to-day contact between public and secular authorities, the monitoring "infringes precisely those Establishment Clause values at the root of the prohibition of excessive entanglement."
Although it was true that the state's assistance to parochial schools did not have the primary effect of advancing religion, the close interaction between state and church nevertheless had that result:
In short, the religious school, which has as a primary purpose the advancement and preservation of a particular religion must endure the ongoing presence of state personnel whose primary purpose is to monitor teachers and students in an attempt to guard against the infiltration of religious thought.
Significance
Although the Court acknowledged that the purpose of the law was secular, the possibility of religious advancement and entanglement made it unconstitutional. As with so many times in the past, Court was hesitant to permit public employees into religious classrooms for fear that they may engage in religious instruction - direct or indirect. Even indirect support of religion constituted a breach of the separation of church and state.
This was not a popular Court Decision, especially in New York City with its large Catholic population. Public officials proceeded to spend in excess of $100 million in public tax dollars from federal education funds to provide the same Title I services to the same parochial school students.
Now, however, the city leased vans that were parked on public streets just outside of religious schools. These vans served as public classrooms for parochial school students and state employees to meet on allegedly neutral ground.
The city eventually took the unusual step of filing a motion in Federal Court seeking an injunction to have the Supreme Court's order lifted. They claimed that circumstances had changed, allowing them to seek such relief and they had a case, since the Supreme Court justices themselves invited an appeal in their Court Decision in the case of Kiryas Joel Board of Education v. Grumet in 1994.
Further Information
Back To: Court Decisions on Religious Liberty (main page)
-->