Decision: Williams v. Pryor (2000)
Obscenity, Sex, and Toys
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Are so-called "sex toys" obscene, such that it is legitimate for the government to ban their sale and distribution? Some certainly believe so - they would like to eliminate all devices which are designed to "stimulate" the "genitalia". According to them, people do not have any fundamental rights when it comes to to their own sexuality.
Background Information
In 1998, a law enacted by the legislature of the State of Alabama amended the obscenity provisions of the Alabama Code to make the distribution of certain defined sexual devices a criminal offense. After the 1998 amendment, the Alabama Code obscenity provisions stated:
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute any obscene material or any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value.
The statute also did not restrict possession or use of a sexual device by an individual, but only the commercial distribution of the devices. A first violation was a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum fine of $10,000 and up to one year of jail or hard labor; a subsequent violation was a class C felony.
Vendors and users of such devices filed a constitutional challenge to the statute. The district court declined to hold that the statute violated any constitutional right but determined the statute was unconstitutional because it lacked a rational basis. The court permanently enjoined enforcement of the statute and the case was appealed to the 11th Circuit Court.
Court Decision
The 11th Circuit Court reversed the decision of the district court. Whether a statute is constitutional is primarily decided based upon the level of scrutiny applied by courts. Statutes which infringe fundamental rights, or which make distinctions based upon suspect classifications such as race or national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny.This requires that the statute be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.
On the other hand, if the law being challenged does not burden a fundamental right nor target a suspect class, it is found constitutional as long as it has some rational relation to a legitimate state purpose. In practice, almost no laws are nullified as not having such a rational relation. It is irrelevant if a theoretically rational reason was actually the one which motivated the legislature.
The district court considered three possible reasons for banning the sexual devices: banning the public display of obscene material, banning the commerce of sexual stimulation unrelated to marriage, procreation or family relationships and banning the commerce of obscene material. All three were found to be legitimate state interests, but the court did not agree with the state that the law in question actually advanced any of those interests.
The 11th Circuit Court rejected the arguments used here by the district court:
Alabama argues "a ban on the sale of sexual devices and related orgasm stimulating paraphernalia is rationally related to a legitimate legislative interest in discouraging prurient interests in autonomous sex" and that "it is enough for a legislature to reasonably believe that commerce in the pursuit of orgasms by artificial means for their own sake is detrimental to the health and morality of the State." Appellant's Brief at 13, 16. The criminal proscription on the distribution of sexual devices certainly is a rational means for eliminating commerce in the devices, which itself is a rational means for making the acquisition and use of the devices more difficult.
The 11th Circuit Court did agree with the district court's rejection of the constitutional challenge to the law and the idea that any right to privacy is at stake here:
The fundamental constitutional rights of privacy recognized to date by the Supreme Court in the area of sexual activity each have followed from the Court's protection of a person's right to make the decision not to procreate without governmental interference. ...None of these cases, however, is decisive on the question whether the Constitution protects every individual's right to private sexual activity and use of sexual devices from being burdened by Alabama's sexual device distribution criminal statute.
Extending the constitutional right to privacy to include a broad fundamental right to all sexual autonomy, such as a privacy right to engage in any form of private consensual sexual behavior between adults, is directly precluded by Supreme Court precedent
.The court did, however, instruct the district court to reconsider one part of the case: whether or not the challenges of married and unmarried couples who actively use the devices has a constitutional basis. Although they refused to recognize any general right of sexual privacy which might be at stake, they did acknowledge that specific plaintiffs might have a valid claim to sexual privacy which must be considered.
Significance
This case is an important piece of the legacy of Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the Supreme Court found that citizens have no right to engage in homosexual activity. Although other Supreme Court decisions have found that people have fundamental rights regarding the ability to procreate - or not procreate, depending upon what a person chooses - it does not follow that sexuality itself is actually a part of a person's private life.
Citing a case involving assisted suicide, Washington v. Glucksberg, this decision favorably quoted the ominous words:
That many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected....
It can't be made any more plain than that: just because a decision regarding sexuality or the continuance of your own life is recognized as important, intimate and personal doesn't mean that you actually have a right to make it yourself, without government interference.
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