Decision: Weems v. United States (1910)
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
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Just what is "cruel and unusual punishment"? If the government is to be prevented from using it, the government has to understand just what is included in that category. It is simply whatever we don't like? Does it only mean whatever the authors of the Constitution thought qualified as "cruel and unusual"?
Background Information
Weems was 'a duly appointed, qualified, and acting disbursing officer of the Bureau of Coast Guard and Transportation of the United States Government of the Philippine Islands,' who had been convicted of falsifying official records of the United States Coastguard which resulted in the government being defrauded of the total of 612 pesos.
The Philippine Criminal Code mandated 15 years in prison with hard labor for this offense, plus the added punishment of cadena temporal which required him to be constantly in chains. In addition, he lost all political rights during imprisonment, was subject to permanent surveillance after his release, and was fined 4,000 pesetas.
Weems appealed his conviction on the grounds that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
Court Decision
The Supreme Court, voting 4 - 2, found that Weems' punishment did indeed meet the standards as "cruel and unusual." The decision admitted that defining the nature of "cruel and unusual punishment" is difficult and that the records indicate that at least some of the authors approved of punishments like flogging and ear cropping. However:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, 'designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.' The future is their care, and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value, and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality. And this has been recognized. The meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction.
The clause of the Constitution, in the opinion of the learned commentators, may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice
Significance
This decision is significant for issues beyond "cruel and unusual punishment" - like privacy cases - because it explicitly sets forth the idea that the intent of the original authors need not be the final guide for interpretation. Instead, the language needs to be approached as general principles, the expression of which may change over the course of time.
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