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Entitlement: Paradox of Property
Paradox of Property
Entitlement: The Paradox of Property
by Joseph William Singer. Published by Yale University Press.

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What is property, and how should society control its use - if at all? Such questions may sound rather esoteric and irrelevant to how most people live their lives, but just the opposite is true. How property is viewed and regulated is among the most fundamental issues which determine how a society is to be structured.

The reason for this is that property represents power, and so the distribution of property amounts to the distribution of power in that society. Thus, deciding just what property is and what people can do with their property amounts to deciding how power in society is to be structured and exercised. When property is held by only a few, then power is also exercised by a few. When the ownership of property is widespread, power is also spread throughout society.

So what is property? The question may seem simple, but it isn't as obvious and clear as many normally assume. At its most basic, something is "property" when someone has the rights to control the thing and exclude others from use of that thing. It also includes the rights to transfer title or ownership of that thing and having immunity from the thing being taken away.

Normally, people regard these abilities to control property as the "norm" and any limits to these abilities as "exceptions." Thus, anyone who wishes to create any exceptions to an owner's ability to use or transfer property bears the "burden of proof" in order to justify the new limitations, and the owner should be compensated for their loss. This conception of property is pervasive, and is known as the "ownership model." Singer discusses many aspects of this model, among them:

Historical entitlement. Ownership rights are created at a particular moment in time and fixed for all eternity. They can only be changed with the consent of the owner. Changes in the world or in the environment in which the property is located have no effect on the owner's rights. Nor does it matter if a particular use of property generates changing effects over time as the social context changes. Neither the identity of the owner nor the package of rights in the ownership bundle can change without the owner's consent. Only two moments matter: the moment of initial creation or acquisition and the moment of transfer. Events that happen in between or after them have no effect on the rights of the owner.

Control of things. The ownership concept directs our attention, first and foremost, to the relation between persons and things. It focuses attention on the owner's control of the thing that is owned. In so doing, it takes our attention away from the fact that an owner's legal rights over a thing make other people vulnerable to effects of the owner's use of it. Making the owner-thing relation central suppresses our consideration of the relationships structured by property rights.

Many owners and self-regarding uses. Although we are aware that there are many owners, we often assume that each person's use of her property concerns herself alone. It is assumed in the simple ownership model that property use has few or no effects on others for which the owner need account. Economists would say that there are no externalities; no one but the owner is affected by either the recognition of property rights in the owner or the ways in which the owner uses the property. From a moral standpoint the owner's activity and rights are self-regarding; they legitimately concern no one but the owner. Conflicts among owners appear minimal in this picture and, given the self-regarding nature of ownership, the rights of owners appear obviously to trump the rights of nonowners.

Harm. Ownership rights can be limited only to prevent harm to other people. It is accepted that not all harms are preventable and that not all harms are illegitimate. Differentiating between harms one should bear as a member of the community and harms one should not have to bear requires a determination of the interests of owners and nonowners that merit protection by the legal system. In defining those rights of security of person or property, however, the burden of persuasion traditionally rests on the party seeking to restrict the "free" actions of the owner whose conduct is supposed to have caused the harm

The ownership model is captured in Jonathan Larson's play Rent (1996) when the landlord, Benny, says that "the owner of that lot next door has the right to do with it as he pleases." This idea is commonplace in American culture and has a strong intuitive appeal. However:

Ownership does not and cannot mean absolute power within a rigid boundary. This conception of property is an inaccurate and distorted picture of the ownership rights that are at the core of a market system. It does not exist, because absolute property rights do not exist in a society that values individuals; property rights, like all legal rights, must be limited when they impinge on legitimate, legally protected interests of others. Because of the built-in tensions in the property concept, and between personal rights and property rights, there is no built-in structure to the market form of property.

It is exactly this "ownership model" which Singer challenges in his book, and he calls it misleading and morally defective. Fundamentally, this model rejects the idea that ownership of property includes an aspect of obligation. Obligations imply limits on one's ability to use property, but the ownership model regards limits as exceptions rather than inherent or necessary.

The ownership model of property comes with a number of contradictions and problems, one of the most important of which is the fact that it decries regulation of property, but the distinctions between regulatory and deregulatory laws are not clean and clear enough:

The relation between property and regulation therefore is paradoxical. In one sense they seem pitted against each other, for regulations limit property rights. But in another sense property rights themselves are forms of regulation, for they grant to individuals the right to call on the power of the state to exclude others from "finite and critical goods" that others need. Thus property regulates nonowners as well as other owners.

Zoning laws are one example of this ambiguity. Clearly, they regulate property in that they tell owners that certain uses of their land are excluded. But people who own residential homes normally welcome good zoning laws, because they keep the value of that residential property from falling. Zoning laws are a case which should demonstrate that, in many cases, property requires laws and regulations for it to have any meaning.

Another case is the fee tails which used to exist. Fee tails were created to limit transference of property title: when someone attached a fee tail to property, they prevented future owners from transfering the property outside of the family. Fee tails were thus used to ensure family dynasties and keep property ownership limited to fewer families.

Obviously, eliminating fee tails took away some traditional ownership rights. On the other hand, their elimination widened the ability of people in the future to become owners and increased the options which owners had in selling property. It is important to note that their elimination also helped increase the distribution of power in society, because the maintenance of a few dynastic families did not simply keep property in their hands, it also kept social, political and economic power in their hands.

Anti-discrimination laws have a similar effect. They regulate a person's ability to use their property by requiring them to accept minorities as customers in their place of business, but at the same time it ensures that those minorities have access to property in the first place. After all, if you cannot buy property, you cannot become a property owner. Fee tails and anti-discrimination laws represent efforts to ensure that property ownership becomes as wide as possible rather than remaining limited to particular families or races.

Singer makes two fundamental points about property which bring the ownership model into question. First is the common idea property comes with a pre-determined bundle of rights. Singer argues the contrary, that certain rights do not have to stay bundled together. They can instead be disagregated, with some rights being denied to anyone and some being granted to non-owners.

Second is the common idea that property is about relations between people and things. Singer argues instead that property is about relationships between some people and other people - owners and non-owners. Possession of property creates obligations which others have towards owners, but also on the part of owners towards others in society.

While these two points call the ownership model into question, they also provide a way for us to understand the three examples of regulation above (zoning, fee tails, and anti-discrimination laws). In each case, certain traditional ownership rights are removed from the bundle, but the reason is the obligation which property owners have towards the rest of society.

By itself, the traditional ownership model cannot makes sense of those examples because it employs an absolutist language and ideology. That, then, is one of the reasons why the ownership model needs to be replaced or augmented by a more nuanced understanding of what property is and what role it should play in society. Continuing to use it can prevent us from taking the necessary steps in regulation which will improve human social relations.

A property claim is a claim to own, to control, to master, to rule a part of the world. But owners do not live alone, and we no longer like the sound of monarchy. Because property rights may conflict - both with other property rights and with personal rights - we cannot sensibly understand or shape property law without attending to the effects of recognizing a particular individual entitlement.

Singer offers no final answers designed to solve all of our problems. He doesn't pretend to have the key or a perfect ideology. What he does do, however, is ask the right sorts of questions which should cause people to reconsider their usual assumption about property and property rights. Property is normally viewed as something impersonal, but Singer places property in the web of human relationships, arguing that it exists to serve human needs:

Ownership is a contested concept. Property is a social institution that is fraught with tensions. It resolves but also creates conflict, builds and undermines expectations, promotes and threatens liberty, demands and resists regulation. Whatever stability it can offer comes only from recognizing its own contingency. Whatever repose it can confer comes from limiting its own claims.

Singer never uses the words "humanism," but what he presents is a very humanistic perspective on the nature of property and the social relationships which property engenders. On the other hand, he pose a real challenge for libertarians who normally follow the ownership model almost uncritically.

Libertarians generally regard property rights as the most fundamental, and Singer probably would not disagree. He argues, however, that they aren't the only valid interests to consider, and more importantly, that there aren't any easy answers when it comes to resolving property conflicts.

Singer's book isn't always easy to read and is aimed more for an audience of law students than the general public. Nevertheless, his writing isn't arcane and is generally quite engaging. He makes use of many practical examples from actual court cases to illustrate his points, and anyone wishing to invest a little time will come away better for it. This is easily one of the best books I've read over the past year, and I recommend it highly.

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