Individuation and Expression of Love
Do we make War becuase we make Love?
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Could it really be that the death and destruction of war are necessary components to a meaningful life or even the ability to love? Some philosophers have argued exactly that - although the two positions are actually separate ideas, they both rely upon an apparent contradiction and so are discussed together here.
To begin with, why would anyone think that war is an important part of life? According to this argument, life as mere existence isn't very important; instead, what is important is a life "worth living." What this says is that it isn't simply in people's interests to preserve their life, but also aspects of life which give it significance: land, family, ideas, value, religion, etc.
Meaningful existence for human beings thus entails a willingness to preserve those aspects of human life which give it meaning. Indeed, human life demands that we be willing to act to preserve our most important values. But what happens when someone else is willing to harm or even kill us to suppress those values? Capitulation cannot always be an option because often that will result in meaningless existence.
Thus, we are left with dying or killing - and when this happens en masse, what we have is a war. Perhaps the horrible aspects of war should be lamented, but we should not lament the fact that people are willing to fight, die, and kill for their values because that is simply the way things must be for humanity. If we stopped fighting and dying for what we value, we'd be little more than slaves or robots for others.
A similar argument is made in defense of the idea that the willingness to engage in violence, even to the point of war, is part of our capacity as humans to love one another. This tends to be offered as a response to pacifists who argue that universal love for all of humanity should inspire us to set aside hatred and refuse to do harm to others. But how can it be argued that a willingness to kill is a part of our ability to love?
According to this defense of war, the ability to love someone requires that we be willing to defend that person. If we allow that person to be harmed or killed, then it would be difficult for an observer to conclude that we really do love. Defending another person whom we love may entail doing that which is otherwise abhorrent to us. One example might be to die for that person - to accept their fate as our own, in other words. Another might be to kill for that person - to act in their defense by killing a person who threatens to kill them.
In the context of war, can a government really claim to exist for the purpose of defending its citizens if it allows those same citizens to be killed by outside forces? Perhaps it would be wrong to suppose that the government "loves" its citizens, but the basic principle is the same: any failure to act to defend those deemed valuable indicates that they aren't really valuable after all.
These are among the most powerful arguments used to justify the general existence of war. It does seem intuitively true that a refusal to defend others whom you allegedly love or who are supposed to be in your care suggests a dereliction of duty. Nevertheless, the arguments aren't entirely perfect and there are possible objections.
The first argument assumes that only a violent response to an immediate threat upon significant values may be warranted. This is questionable - although we may feel strongly motivated to react violently in such situations, that doesn't mean that other alternatives aren't possible. Perhaps we don't even entirely understand what those alternatives yet, but that doesn't justify dismissing the possibility out of hand.
The second argument ignores the possibility that the person to be defended wouldn't want you to kill on their behalf. Perhaps they would rather die than be the cause, even indirectly, of another's death - an unusual but certainly not impossible position. If you really do love and value this person, shouldn't you accept their wishes and let them die?
In the context of governments protecting their citizens, we can raise the possibility that states shouldn't necessarily exist at all. It is true that a government should be obligated to protect citizens, but that assumes that governments should exist in the first place, something not at all obvious. Thus, although we can see here the strongest arguments defending the possibility of war (however undesirable war may ultimately be), it isn't true that these arguments make war a foregone conclusion.
More: Hegel: Social Values and Universal Spirit
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