If Theism isn't a Delusion, Then What Is It?
The Old Git argues that the standard definition does indeed apply:
One of the most recent of these studies, published 2006, was entitled ‘Need for Closure, Jumping to Conclusions, and Decisiveness in Delusion-Prone Individuals’, by McKay, Langdon & Coltheart, where ‘need for closure’ refers to a motivated need for certainty, whilst ‘jumping-to-conclusions’ bias refers to the gathering of minimal data when making overconfident probabilistic judgements; both of these constructs have been associated independently with delusion-proneness. ...
The findings of this study were that the various facets of need for closure proved to be independent; e.g. intolerance of ambiguity correlated positively with delusion-proneness, whilst decisiveness correlated negatively. The finding that delusion-prone individuals are more indecisive in everyday life was replicated using different scales. Delusion proneness is associated independently with jumping-to-conclusions bias on experimental reasoning tasks, intolerance of ambiguity, and indecision concerning real-life dilemmas
...it is interesting to see how many of these summarized conclusions apply to so-called religious beliefs. If the so-called belief in god is not a motivated need for certainty, and their claims that this god is the’ first cause’ is not the making of overconfident judgements on minimal data, or the fact that believers claim that the rules for living a decent life come from their god indicate that they are unable to act decisively for themselves, and that their whole faith is not the result of their delusions, then what is the cause of it?
So, it sounds like some of the basic attitudes which correlate highly with delusions delusion-proneness also correlate rather well with religion and theism. This doesn't automatically mean that theism, or any other religious belief, is necessarily a delusion of course. It does seem to raise the bar a bit thought for those who seek to argue that such beliefs certainly aren't delusions. If these beliefs look an awful lot like the sorts of things otherwise normally labeled delusions, is it wise to not put them all in the same category merely because one group is more popular than the other? Is it really justified to label someone as "deluded" in part because they hold firmly to unpopular delusions?
Comments
Can decisiveness be used in this argument the way The Old Git has? I am inclined to think that a measure of decisiveness in such a study would refer to a group of decisions rather than one specific or independent one.
With that in mind, I would say that portion of the study actually works against his/her argument, since decisions based on belief are more restrictive in concession and comprimise.
compromise…spelling
Can one think of nothing? If so, then nothing is possible; if not so, then nothing is impossible. Nothing, by its own definition, isn’t there; so what business have we of the concept at all? It is an “absolute” concept that doesn’t exist. How dare we stretch our imaginations so; as if we should tolerate a concept that would define a piece of infinite…what sheer madness.
Marcel,
If the something you think of is a delusion, your are better off thinking of nothing.
I can think of Cthulhu. Therefore Cthulhu is possible. Now, Marcel, will you be the first to be devoured?
It is unequivocal that the pathological nature of some religious beliefs are considered delusional, in psychiatric circles, at least, and this has been evidenced by the findings of no less than the World Health Organisation, amongst others. Admittedly this evidence is susceptible to the difficulty that practitioners have in making a diagnostic distinction between culturally sanctioned beliefs and religious delusions qua delusions. However, other research has shown that there is no clear distinction in the psychometric comparison between individuals reporting spiritual experiences and those reporting psychotic experiences.
The current cognitive neuropsychiatric model of monothematic delusion formation and maintenance is the two-deficit, or two factor model of delusions. Whilst it is not appropriate to discuss this at length here, it should suffice to say that the two-factor model does provide a plausible explanation for some domains of bizarre belief. Thus, the issue is whether beliefs of a religious nature can be accurately described as delusional within the two-factor model, and there is a growing body of evidence that it can.
As the paper ‘Hallucinating God? The Cognitive Neuropsychiatry of Religious Belief and Experience’ by Ryan McKay concluded:
I suspect that this issue wouldn’t be coming up if the “deluded” would just keep their “faith” to themselves. By keeping it front and center, and in our “faces” so much of the time, they’ve made us examine and identify it–to their detriment.
I don’t see it necessarily interfering with their lives, specifically their jobs, although they do steal from the boss when they insist on jabbering about their “savior” while on the clock. Otherwise, a little (or a lot!) discretion could ease the pressure on them.
OTOH, they get very prickly about having to “pipe down”, don’t they? And they conveniently play the martyr, thus fulfilling all our suspicions that they are delusional.
I rest my case…
If it is a delusion, why is it so persistent? I would say that delusions are lies agreed upon. If a person sees the image of Jesus in a cupcake he could sucker himself into believing that a coinicidence or magic are true.
The power comes with the concurrence of others.
We need to be careful about this concept of “delusion.” It is very elastic. After all, in 20th century Russia, it was considered delusional to believe that there be a better alternative to the prevailing government. Undoubtedly, much of what is presented as spirituality or religion is delusion in the truest sense. The problem is that like so much else in psychology–a very soft science (and often not really a science at all)–the idea of the human capacity for delusion is useful but not necessarily dispositive. From the strictly scientific point of view, the personal experience of consciousness does not exist at all. Yet is the person who affirms the existence of that experience truly delusional. To the contrary, I say that the person who sincerely denies the existence of this experience suffering from a form of schizophrenia.
Chris Julka,
I was right there with you up until the part about consciousness. What scientific study said consciousness does not exist?
John,
Consider Peter Unger, author of “I do not exist.” Or Daniel Dennett, author of “Consciousness Explained.”
Unger espouses mereological nihilism, the view that the only thing real are elementary particles. Composites of such particles, such as human beings, do not really exist. Dennett maintains that qualia–the properties of sensory experience–do not really exist.
These are philosophers, not necessarily scientists. And these positions are not scientific, per se, but rather metaphysical. Yet they are not the only ones. To the contrary, many scientists, deny that the individual experience of consciousness is anything but illusion, a mere epiphenomenon. To assert anything else, might even be regarded as unrespectable within the scientific community. I am not saying that this view represents bad science, far from it: strictly within the discipline of science, it may make perfect sense, particularly if one aims for parsimony and public verifiability in one’s thought. But I also maintain this position is manifestly false. How do I reconcile these two positions? My view: science is the best body of knowledge that money can buy, and thus deserves our respect, but it still only gets you so far. Science is not the same thing as omniscience. Thus, it is appropriate to retain skepticism not only toward religious dogmatism, but toward dogmas that are purely secular as well, psychology having contained many of such dogmas, as time has shown. For that reason, I do not accept the wholesale dismissal of religion, even if it is said to be scientific.
Since when is correctly seeing religion as delusional activity dismissing it, in part or in whole?