The general social, political, and religious attitude towards racial discrimination in America is that it is essentially and necessarily wrong. Given that racial discrimination has traditionally been the product of racist animus, this is an understandable conclusion - but is it possible to discriminate without animus and for justified, reasonable goals? Yes, probably.

In issue 32 of The Philosophers' Magazine, Simon Clarke writes:

Suppose there is a threat of terrorism by a group of people predominantly made up of those of a certain ethnic origin. The government decides to detain and interrogate people of this race entering the country with more vigour than it does other people. This is discrimination on the basis of race. Yet surely it is not wrong, so long as the threat is real and significant. Some governments are currently implementing similar policies.

It is interesting to note that those who protest against these policies do not say that such policies are racial discrimination and racial discrimination is always wrong. Instead they argue that the seriousness of the threat does not warrant the racial discrimination. But this line of protest implicitly accepts that if the threat were real and significant, then the discrimination would be justified.

If we were 100% sure that a particular threat would be carried out unless we did something, and that the action threatened would kill thousands, perhaps millions of people, and that the only way of stopping it were to interrogate all members of a certain ethnicity (while respecting human rights) coming into the country more than others, then this seems a case where racial discrimination would be justified.

Simon Clarke makes a worthwhile point here. Obviously terrorist groups are intelligent and will change tactics to avoid the likely detection described here, which in turn means that in the long run this tactic will be counter-productive if we focus on in too much. In theory, however, the point is sound: discrimination need not be based upon animus and may, in such cases, but justified.

What’s interesting about this is what it reveals about liberals and conservatives when we contrast the situation with affirmative action. A common criticism of affirmative action is that it is a form of racial discrimination and, therefore, is necessarily wrong. The conservatives who make this argument would not likely say the same about the above scenario, though. Liberals, on the other hand, defend the discrimination of affirmative action as necessary, but would likely object to the above on the grounds that it is discriminatory.

It sounds like both are hypocrites, and perhaps to a degree they are — but not to the same degree. In this context, we find conservatives defending discrimination when it’s done for the sake of security, but objecting to it when it’s done for the sake of helping racial minorities who continue to suffer from the ill effects of segregation and racism. Liberals are defending discrimination when it’s done for the sake of helping society’s most disadvantaged groups, but objecting when used for the sake of hypothetical security (we can dismiss Clarke’s “100% certain scenario” as little more than a thought experiment and not something that can justify real-world policies).

Taking into account the fact the effects of social, racial disadvantage is not “intelligent” and won’t “change tactics” in response to affirmative action — something which terrorists will do in response to racial profiling — and it doesn’t seem reasonable to think that the hypocrisy on both sides is entirely equal. Nevertheless, both sides do need to seriously reconsider their positions in light of this and be able to justify the apparently contradictory positions.

 

Read More:

• Guide to Ethics and Morality
• News About Ethics
• Ethics and Culture
• War and Morality