Moral Relativism & Terri Schiavo
Winston Smith first explains in very clear and comprehensible terms where David Brooks' major failings of logic lie. Brooks wants to claim that trying to leave certain ethical decisions to individuals entails ethical relativism, but Smith argues:
In the Schiavo case in particular, it is that fact that (as Brooks admits) life and death are joined by a continuum that makes the application of the relevant principles difficult or possibly even indeterminate. In a case in which A and B lie on a continuum, there simply will be no clear line between the two, and decisions under such conditions are inevitably hard.
The claim that hard cases should be decided by those most closely affected is, in fact, a claim which forms a central part of at least some justifications of democracy. The Constitution sets down certain principles that are taken to be more-or-less beyond dispute (e.g. that we have rights to free speech and press, due process, etc.), and leaves the rest to us to decide. It’s not because the Founders were relativists, nor that they were nihilists who thought that there were no facts of the matter about e.g. whether theft should be a crime or what marriage should be like. It is, rather, at least in part that they recognized that as questions become more detailed and less clear, it is reasonable to leave the requisite judgment calls up to those who are most affected—i.e. the electorate. So if Brooks were right, our very commitment to democracy might commit us to relativism or nihilism.
Or, alternatively, if Brooks is right then our desire to avoid relativism and/or nihilism would entail that we also avoid democracy. I wouldn't claim that this is something Brooks believes, but it is a principle which many theocratic critics of democracy have held to. They really don't believe that certain ethical questions should be left to individuals, including questions about who is to rule, and for just the sorts of reasons that Smith outlines here. I'm thinking, just as an example, about the complaints of "godless democracy" made by certain extremists in Iraq.
Part of this is because such people don't think that there are many, if any, ethical questions which are truly difficult. If they seem difficult, it's just because we haven't spent enough time and effort studying religious scripture — once we do, God's will shall be made clear. And, of course, if God's will is clear on an ethical matter, then it's wrong to allow anyone to transgress that will.
Winston is, I think, arguing at least in part that Brooks' argument is wrong because it leads to an absurd conclusion: we are closer to nihilism because of our commitment to democracy. Given the theocratic atmosphere that is growing in America, I would add that Brooks' argument is also dangerous: the theocrats' fear of nihilism can lead to flight from democracy.
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