Weekly Quote: Gilson on Revelation

We cannot believe in something, be it the Word of God Himself, unless we find some sense in the formulas which we believe. And it can hardly be expected that we will believe in God's Revelation, unless we be given good reasons to think that such a Revelation has indeed taken place.
- Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages. (1938)

It’s not all that uncommon for Christian apologists to argue that belief in God is rational because of the existence of God’s revelation to humans in the Bible. Apologists for other religions, like Islam, can make similar claims. The problem inherent in such an argument is the fact that the “evidence” of God’s revelation can’t count for must unless one is already committed to accepting it as indeed coming from God. That, however, would render the argument itself rather unnecessary.

All of this might seem obvious if not trivial, but it isn’t obvious or trivial to some. Their commitment to believing in God and God’s revelation is so strong, so much a part of who they are, that it never occurs to them that someone else might not only lack the same commitment but might in fact consider it irrational and unwarranted. When one grows up never doubting the truth of some proposition, it’s understandable that they would try to use that proposition when formulating arguments.

Gilson’s observation here is relevant not only to the specific circumstances surrounding certain apologetics but also to the importance of skepticism generally. What Gilson says could be applied to a wide range of phenomenon and generalized to read: we cannot be expected to believe the truth of something, no matter how important, unless we are given good reasons to think that it is true. If there is any central and fundamental principle to skepticism, this would be it.

Of course, what is supposed to qualify as “good reasons”? That’s where the real disagreements and debates lie. Most people believe most things based upon reasons of some sort and typically reasons that seemed good — at least, they seemed good at the time that the belief was formulated. The nature of what reasons qualify as “good” and what reasons qualify as “poor” will depend upon the topic being considered, the person involved, and what sort of “theory of truth” they employ.

Are they more like pragmatists, accepting as truth whatever seems to “work” for them? Do they employ something like a coherency theory of truth, accepting as truth whatever fits in well with the things they already believe? Of course, a person using one theory of truth may find that a person using a different theory is basing her beliefs on irrational reasons. Would such a judgement be justified? Only if the theory of truth in question is wrong, being applied incorrectly, or being used in an inappropriate context.

It’s easy to say that we need good reasons to accept some claim as true, but when pressed to explain what we mean by “good reasons” it can sometimes be a bit more difficult to explain what we mean. Unless we are clear on what we mean by “truth” and why we accept certain things as true rather than others, we might not be prepared to give the claims the attention and consideration we should.

More Weekly Quotes: commentary and analysis each week on a different quotation dealing with philosophy, religion, and more.