If a person makes an ethical judgment - for example, that some action is ethically wrong - does this automatically mean that they are motivated not to do it? Some think so and are labeled "internalists," but others disagree and argue that ethical judgments do not automatically come along with motivations.

Jonathan Ichikawa writes about a study done by Adina Roskies on people suffering from damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex of their brains and exhibit what she calls "acquired sociopathy":

She considers case studies of patients who have suffered damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex of the brain -- this includes the famous case of Phineas Gage. Gage suffered an accident which left his normal reasoning and intelligence intact, but gave him "acquired sociopathy" -- he suddenly "failed to act reliably in socially acceptable ways, regardless of whether those were delineated either by widely held ethical judgments or by social convention." (p. 56) She also discusses similar, more recent case studies.

This is an interesting issue. Many people will instinctively think that ethical judgments entail motivation - even if that isn't the only motivation and even if they have strong motivations to act contrary to their ethical judgments. Still, some motivation is still always there, right? Maybe not.

Read More:

• Guide to Ethics and Morality
• Bioethics