Texas: Abusive Exorcisms Protected by Law

You may have already read about the Texas Supreme Court decision which threw our a damages award given to 17-year-old girl over injuries suffered during an exorcism. According to the court, this award unconstitutionally entangled church and state, so the cuts, bruises, and physical restraint she experienced as a minor were protected by the law as an exercise of religious freedom. What? Since when do churches have a constitutionally protected right to inflict mental and physical suffering on minor children?

Laura Schubert testified in 2002 that she was cut and bruised and later experienced hallucinations after the church members' actions in 1996, when she was 17. Schubert said she was pinned to the floor for hours and received carpet burns during the exorcism, the Austin American-Statesman reported. She also said the incident led her to mutilate herself and attempt suicide. She eventually sought psychiatric help. ...

The 2002 trial of the case never touched on the religious aspects, and a Tarrant County jury found the Colleyville church and its members liable for abusing and falsely imprisoning the girl. The jury awarded her $300,000, though the 2nd Court of Appeals in Fort Worth later reduced the verdict to $188,000.

Source: MSNBC

At first, this seems like it should be an easy case, but some argue that perhaps the Texas Supreme Court was correct:

This wasn’t an atheist held down by believers: this was a young woman who apparently fully agreed with her fellow churchgoers that Satan could be on the prowl. And after this first incident, she kept attending the church activities for days without complaint. In fact, the emotional harms she ultimately suffered seemed to have stemmed ultimately from believing their goobledygook about evils spirits too much, rather than too little.

And this leads to the key element of the decision: that the original court ruling rested on primarily emotional injuries, and that these are essentially interpretive: they’re based on the girl’s own later interpretation of the experiences she had at the church, many of which seemed to involve an actual belief in demons tormenting her.

Source: The Bad Idea Blog

These are interesting and legitimate points, but I don't think they ultimately make a good case for the higher court's ruling. Being held down against one's will is, technically, false imprisonment and battery — and remember that this was done to an underage girl, who cannot technically give consent in all matters. Even if no criminal charges are filed, this creates a legitimate basis for a civil lawsuit regardless of the motives of those who committed the alleged actions.

The plaintiff could not legally get damages for any of the religious characteristics of the experience. She could not, for example, sue and get damages because her faith was shaken or because she now has bad feelings towards organized religion. The primary dissent in the Supreme Court's decision argues quite reasonably, though, that juries and courts can and should separate out religious and secular aspects of a case.

Such separation may not be easy and may not always be perfect, but that's never a reason to conclude that it can't be done and therefore there can be no redress for any of the secular crimes or distress:

...while the Court points to Dr. Helge's testimony as proof that Schubert's religious and secular damages are inextricably intertwined, another expert, Dr. Millie Astin, specifically stated that she could separate the two. And Schubert testified that while she was being restrained she was afraid she 'was being injured' and that she 'might die'-trauma clearly associated with the act of restraint itself. Although segregating the religious from the secular may sometimes be difficult, it can and should be done.

Granted, there is always the risk that jurors might unconsciously take the religious character of the experience into consideration. They might, for example, be prejudiced against a church because it practices a minority faith or is considered heretical by mainstream churches. That's always a risk in any cases involving religious institutions, however, and can't be a reason to dismiss such cases entirely as the Texas Supreme Court did here. Reversal is only legitimate when it can be demonstrated that prejudice was at work and from my reading there have not even been any allegations of that.

So I have to conclude that the Texas Supreme Court's decision here was not just wrong, but should be treated as obviously wrong. Churches should not be allowed to engage in false imprisonment and battery of minor children simply because it's part of their religious tradition, because they are religious institutions, or because it might be difficult to separate the religious and secular aspects of the physical and mental suffering which they inflict on a person. Such cases will probably be complicated and difficult to decide well, but they should be decided and plaintiffs should get a hearing in court.