The Future of Iran's Islamic Theocracy (Book Notes: In the Shadow of the Prophet)
In In the Shadow of the Prophet: The Struggle for the Soul of Islam, Milton Viorst writes:
[Javad] Tabatabai [a specialist in Islamic law who works at the Encyclopedia Islamica, an Iranian publication and research center], like most Iranians, feels no nostalgia for the Shah, despite his cheerful prediction that the Islamic regime is doomed. Iran’s language is religious, he said, but its spirit is political.
The Shah’s regime was totalitarian, he said, but unfortunately, the regime was too identified with America for the opposition to consider Western democracy as an alternative. Religion was the opposition’s only available weapon, and now that it has become an instrument of oppression, the people are unwilling to put up with it. The Islamic state, he said, will not survive another decade.
“Khomeini seized upon the idea of theocracy,” he said, “proposing to use the clergy as agents of the Prophet. Making Iran into an Islamic state meant transforming Islam into a political faith. This government will never legitimize a secular opposition, so it will never evolve. It will stay as it is, or fall.”
Pay close attention to the fact that these words are coming not from an atheist or non-Muslim dissident in Iran, but a Muslim with a position of responsibility and authority in the field of Islamic law. When a Muslim political system loses the support of people like him, it’s in serious trouble — and it’s not just that he fails to enthusiastically support the current regime, but he’s unwilling to really support any theocratic regime, no matter who holds power.
Imagine how disillusioned the average Iranian must be, if people like Tabatabai can hold views like this. The government of Iran surely knows just how much trouble they are in — and by that I mean not just those who happen to be in power at the moment, but the entire system which they have supported and defended for most of their adult lives. The very principle of an Islamic, theocratic government, something upon which they have based their sense of identity and social position, is being questioned and even dismissed by the very people they are supposed to be serving.
The long-term prospects of political Islam in Iran are thus very doubtful. Iran’s leaders can’t be too happy about this, but what can they do? If people are disillusioned with the nature of the system itself, basic reforms will hardly be enough (and too few hardliners are interested in doing even that much). Throughout history, though, there has been one means for governments in this situation to rally the support of the people: find enemies that can serve as scapegoats for all the internal problems.
These enemies will preferably be both external and internal. Iran has plenty of external enemies to attack — Israel is the biggest and Jews have a long history of being made scapegoats. Other Western nations are also good enemies, especially given their support of Israel. I’m not aware of any strong movement against internal enemies, but if it hasn’t started then it’s only a matter of time. Identifying all these enemies will allow the government to move without mercy against critics (they become the enemy) and shore up what little support might be left.
This is why people outside Iran need to be very concerned about what’s going on. Iranian leaders are essentially trapped in a corner with no way to escape except to lash out against anyone in convenient reach. People in such a position cannot be trusted to act and think rationally — they are desperate in way that is hard to fathom and they probably think that they don’t have much to lose.
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