Ethics and Materialism: Compatible?

A little while ago I responded to someone who claimed that it wasn't possible for an atheist to live a consistent atheistic worldview. Their reason was... well, there really wasn't any reason, aside from his not being able to imagine it. Now he thinks he has a reason.

Donalgrant writes:

The first statement, which I will try to translate into a more logical argument, is the following:

Assumption: Happiness and Suffering of other human beings matter to us. Ethical Conclusion: Whenever possible, we should increase their happiness and decrease their suffering.

Note that I will not assume that this is every atheist's ethic, nor even Cline's own ethic (though that is perhaps more likely), but rather an example of an ethic being put forward as something consistent with a completely consistent materialist world-view.

I will not quibble with whether or not the ethical conclusion is a good ethic -- I will accept it as "an ethic". (I.e., does this ethic call for Euthenasia [sic]?) However, I have two other difficulties with this argument:

1) The assumption does not follow from a self-consistent materialist world-view.
2) "Whenever possible" may not include any ethical choice for a materialist.

For item (1), I can imagine that Cline would argue, "How dare you challenge my assumption: I am telling you that happiness and suffering of other human beings matters to us." And I am sure it does. But I also assert that this is an inconsistency in the world-view of a professing materialist. Why should happiness and suffering, if they are merely chemical reactions in the brain of a material human object -- a biological machine, matter to us? ... If a materialist could choose one way or the other, why should a materialist care more about maintaining the organization (the life) of a human being than the coherence of a crystal-lattice?

Remember that I said that Donalgrant's reason for asserting that a self-consistent atheist worldview wasn't possible was his own inability to conceive how it might be so? Well, here we have the same again. Donalgrant doesn't provide a single reason why we should think that the premise "Happiness and Suffering of other human beings matter to us." is inconsistent with either materialism or atheism. Not one. Nada. Zilch Zero. Zip.

Have I made my point yet? A person's failure to imagine how others are different from them does not constitute an argument for why it isn't possible for them to be different. It is, instead, a sign that the person hasn't spent any time trying to learn more about the subject. Donalgrant writes that "My continuation of this discussion, although coming from a theistic bias, represents continued contemplation of what atheists, including Cline, think and mean," but I doubt he has picked up a book by any atheists on subjects like morality.

Does that matter? Yes, if he is going to argue that materialism is incompatible with values, meaning, and ethical choices. He could be taken much more seriously if he has spent time reading recent literature and philosophy making a materialist case for things like ethics than simply operating from his own assumptions and imagination.

My atheist former-boss, in these conversations, claimed that empathy was the key: that the higher creatures are on an evolutionary scale, the more empathy they have with others. A worm has no empathy, a dog may exhibit some (but a cat, none -- just kidding!), and enlightened human beings exhibit great empathy. I'll agree to this observation (not that I know about the inner workings of worms, dogs or very enlightened human beings...), but still maintain that it does not address the materialist dilemna [sic]. For a materialist, what is the difference between a sophisticated version of the Eliza program and an empathetic human being? Both obey programming, some of it deterministic, some of it perhaps randomized, but none of it able to make an independent choice, an unforced expression of empathy.

Empathy plays a very important role in the lives of social animals — and an increasing role the more social they are and the closer they are to use, evolutionarily speaking. There is no "materialist dilemma" here, there is merely a Donalgrant Dilemma.

Perhaps the foremost problem in the Donalgrant Dilemma (at this stage) is the belief that "empathy" is a "choice." Although he makes a lot of unfounded claims about the incompatibility of materialism and free will, here he actually makes a correct observation about empathy and choice; unfortunately, he does so in the context of assuming that empathy is choice. When we see an injured person or kitten, who consciously deliberates over whether they will experience empathy for their situation? When we see a beautiful person or painting, who deliberates over whether they will find them/it attractive?

Such reactions are not the product of immediate acts of will. They aren't choices in the same sense that raising my arm is a choice. Now, we can choose to create the conditions that will make such reactions more or less likely — we could, for example, make sympathy for a person's plight more likely by trying to understand what has happened to them in the hopes that we might become sympathetic. This is not, however, the same as deliberately and consciously saying to yourself "I decide now to have sympathy for this person," as if you could have just as easily said the opposite.

Which leads me to the issue with item (2): "Whenever possible". The problem with the ethic for a materialist of "increasing happiness and decreasing suffering whenever possible" is that the possibility is not under the control of the material being. ... Indeed, the materialist can make no true choices at all -- all choice is illusion.

Whether "free will" exists or not is an interesting philosophical question. Donalgrant's discussion of that question is... well, superficial might be a generous way to put it. Apparently he believes that free will only exists in his theistic system and doesn't exist at all in a materialistic/atheistic system. He doesn't define what he means by "free will" or how it is incompatible with materialism, completely ignoring compatibilist arguments (they aren't without their flaws, but a person should at least demonstrate familiarity with them before acting like they have nothing to offer).

Donalgrant's failure to appreciate the complexity of discussions about free will in philosophy is made manifest in another post where he argues that materialism necessarily entails determinism and this, in turn, prevents anything from being meaningful. In that post, however, he makes even more errors that this. He asserts, for example, that meaning can only exist in the context of choice. Why? Well, he doesn't say — he just asserts it.

It's easy to imagine stumbling across a painting which touches me on a subconscious level, perhaps resonating with experiences I have had without my even realizing it. This painting will be meaningful to me but, initially at least, I won't even know why. I certainly didn't choose for it to be meaningful. I didn't even choose to see it.

As Donalgrant notes, meaning is "a way of connecting one thing with another," but not all connections we make are even conscious, much less deliberately and consciously chosen. It is the case that meaning can be dependent upon our choices; it is not the case that meaning cannot occur even without our making choices.

What Donalgrant doesn't note, however, is the connection meaning has to what we value. I don't find a dinner to be meaningful because of the food I chose, I find it meaningful (for example) because of the company I had — in other words, because I value time spent with this person.

Even if we grant Donalgrant's idea that materialism requires hard determinism and that therefore free will doesn't exist, his criticism fails. After all, if I have no free will then I had no choice but to value this person's company and find the meal to be a meaningful experience. If someone is going to argue that something (like meaning) is impossible in the context of materialism, they are going to have to do more than demonstrate that this something is actually inevitable in the context of materialism.

Now, if we dismiss the idea that materialism makes free will impossible, we are left with the question of whether a materialist can (without being inconsistent) value anything. Donalgrant offers no reason to think that this is impossible. He doesn't' seem to believe it and he can't seem to imagine it, but the only "argument" is the idea that free will is impossible in a materialist system.

I assert that Materialism provides no basis for this value other than the evolutionary imperative.

Now, this is the most interesting part of Donalgrant's post. Why? Because it marks a significant shift in his argument. I'm not sure if he knows it or not. If he does, then he is disingenuous. If he doesn't, then he is a victim of muddled thinking.

If we go back to his very first statement on the matter, we find that his claim to be "I don't think a completely consistent atheistic world view will be found to be livable." When challenged, he narrowed it to say "a completely self-consistent atheist (read, "materialist") world-view is not livable." The claim being made here is that for a materialist to do things like value life, they are acting in a manner inconsistent with materialism (i.e., they are acting or believing in a manner that contradicts some aspect of materialism).

Now, however, we are faced with something entirely new: Donalgrant is not claiming that values are inconsistent with materialism; instead, Donalgrant is claiming that values are not supported by materialism (he's talking about one value, but appears to have values and morals generally in mind with this as an example). There's a huge difference between the two because there is nothing illogical about the existence of a value that is not directly derived from materialism but, nevertheless, doesn't logically contradict materialism. To put it simply, the statement "X is inconsistent with Y" is not the same as "Y does not provide a basis for X."

For the record, I don't think that Donalgrant is deliberately and dishonestly shifting the terms of his argument. I think, instead, that he simply isn't clear in his own mind about what he means and what he wants to claim. Notice also that he has started to capitalize materialism here, a further sign I believe of the same problem.

Now, how does he support his claim that values cannot be derived from a materialistic worldview (not simply "derived from materialism" — contrary to his apparent assumption, materialism by itself isn't an entire worldview)?

1) Materialists have a choice to obey the evolutionary imperative -- either (a) or (b) above, or
2) Materialists obey the evolutionary imperative without choice.

Donalgrant seems to be confusing the origins of morality in general with the basis for particular moral choices. It's a common error for people who don't understand evolution. It is true that materialists with scientific eduction will typically ascribe the origins of morality (and even particular moral principles, defined very broadly) to the evolutionary process — they'll do the same with sexual behavior and learning behavior. They will not, however, therefore conclude that all particular moral values/choices made by each individual are therefore directly derived from any "evolutionary imperative" — and the same is true with the sexual or learning choices of any particular individual.

The difference here is between ultimate and proximate causes. The ultimate cause for morality and moral behavior generally is arguably the evolutionary process. The same can be said for much of human behavior. This does not mean, however, that the evolutionary process is the only, the direct, or even the most important cause for any particular instance of that behavior. My language ability has been produced by evolutionary forces, but that doesn't mean that you can go very far in explaining my writing this sentence or my use of particular constructions by referring to evolution. My ability to value others' happiness has been produced by evolutionary forces, but that doesn't mean that you can go very far in explaining my valuing of particular people the same way. To offer a theistic analogy, saying that God is the "ultimate" ground of morality does not, therefore, explain particular moral values or particular moral choices.

This failure to understand the difference between ultimate and proximate causes — and evolution generally — is not the only error here. We are also seeing a continuation of the previous error: Donalgrant cannot conceive of how a materialist can have values and cannot see how values cannot be derived directly out of materialism; therefore Donalgrant feels justified in asserting that values contradict materialism and materialists who have values are not consistently following materialism. Those are two distinct claims, as I have shown, and both are ultimately based upon Donalgrant's inability to imagine how they may be true.

 

In Summary:

Donalgrant has claimed that valuing happiness is inconsistent with materialism, but he does not support this with evidence or arguments. The best he can offer is the question "If a materialist could choose one way or the other, why should a materialist care more about maintaining the organization (the life) of a human being than the coherence of a crystal-lattice?" In other words, the best he can offer for his assertion that an atheist can't have a basis for morality is that he can't come up with one.

Donalgrant doesn't define materialism — a fatal flaw in any argument purporting to critique materialism. He acts as though it were a coherent philosophy all on its own (thus the occasional capitalization) rather than a principle which, in various forms, plays a role in other philosophies. He talks about examining "in detail" a "materialist world-view" when he has done nothing of the sort; instead, he has made a couple of assumptions about what materialism entails without demonstrating that this is so and basing conclusions on that.

Then again, it would be difficult to argue that people cannot be self-consistent "materialists" when materialism is nothing more than a single principle — how can a single principle contradict itself? It can't. Instead, it would be necessary to argue how that principle contradicts other principles and that, in turn, would require analyzing multiple philosophies and the different ways in which they incorporate materialism with other principles, beliefs, and ideas.

Donalgrant does not believe that free will is consistent with materialism, but he doesn't offer anything more than the most superficial arguments in defense of this and no arguments in defense of free will being consistent with non-materialist beliefs. He doesn't demonstrate the slightest familiarity with philosophical work on the question of free will, for example compatibilism. Of course, if free will doesn't exist, then we have no choice but to value what we do — thus providing the basis for having certain values rather than others.

Donalgrant shifts his argument from "materialism isn't consistent with values" to "values can't be derived from materialism" without indicating that he even realizes that he is doing this — and he may not even understand the difference. He further asserts that evolution cannot provide a basis for values without recognizing the difference between the concepts of "evolution provides the basis for having moral systems" and "evolution provides the basis/reasons for some particular moral choice." Again, it's unclear if he even recognizes that this difference exists.

Based upon all of this, Donalgrant concludes:

The Materialist Dilemna [sic]: a purely material being cannot choose to act ethically, but if it could choose, it would find no basis upon which to make a choice.

I think it's clear now that nothing Donalgrant has written on this matter is correct. There is only "no basis" for moral choices because Donalgrant can't conceive of such a basis. Why can't he conceive of such a basis? Often it seems like a failure of imagination on his part; other times, it seems like his thinking on the matter is simply muddled, perhaps due to simply not knowing the full depth and breadth of the issues that he is superficially touching upon.

Donalgrant says that "it is actually pretty hard to prove a negative." This is true (it's also true that, contrary to his assertion, I haven't asked him to "prove" anything, only "support" his claims — there is a big difference between the two). This is also why it is wise not to assert existential negatives too strongly. It's ethically and epistemically irresponsible to assert the truth of something when you cannot support your claim. I wouldn't claim that Donalgrant has no understanding of C.S. Lewis and, when challenged, insist "but that's too hard to prove!" How absurd. If I had no evidence to support the claim, it would be wrong for me to have made it. Complaining that it is difficult to support your claims is not an excuse — if it's too difficult to do, then don't make the original assertions in the first place.

On a final note, it appears that some have assumed that I have taken Donalgrant's comments personally. Those who know me will realize that that isn't the case. I don't personally know Donalgrant and therefore do not value his opinions about me, personally. That isn't any reflection on him, it's simply that I don't care whether he thinks highly or poorly of me. At most, my comments here merely reflect annoyance with the widespread inability of theists on the net reason well and properly research matters relating to atheism and philosophy before they launch into extended essays that are backed by little more than assumptions and personal prejudices.

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